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COMMENT 
RADTKE v. EVERETT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT'S REJECTION 
OF THE REASONABLE WOMANNICTIM 
STANDARD: TREATING PERSPECTIVES 
THAT ARE DIFFERENT AS THOUGH THEY 
WERE EXACTLY ALIKE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Everyone is prisoner of his own experiences. No 
one can eliminate prejudices - just recognize 
them. 1 
Our society has recognized the evils of gender discrimina-
tion. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "is aimed at the 
prejudices and biases borne against persons because of their 
membership in a certain class, and seeks to eliminate the 
effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and 
biases."2 "Sex" was included under the auspices of Title VII to 
combat discrimination resulting from cultural prejudices re-
garding gender. 3 
Sexual harassment litigation has forced us to reevaluate 
1. Edward R. Murrow, News Commentary, Dec. 31, 1955. 
2. Miller v. C.A Muer Corp., 352 N.W.2d 650, 653 (Mich. 1984). 
3. See House Legislative Second Analysis, HB 4407, August 15, 1980: Sexual 
harassment should be explicitly defined and prohibited because it is a demeaning, 
degrading, and coercive activity directed at persons on the basis of their sex, the 
continuation of which is often contingent on the harasser's economic control over 
the person being harassed. It should be outlawed because it violates basic human 
rights of privacy, freedom, sexual integrity and personal security. 
255 
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the factor of gender in formulating judicial definitions of rea-
sonable behavior. Currently, the circuit courts are divided 
regarding the validity of adopting a female perspective when 
evaluating sexual harassment claims.4 Since the late 1980's, 
the federal and state courts, when determining whether sexual 
behavior has created an abusive or "hostile" environment, have 
gradually acknowledged that males and females perceive dif-
ferently the types of sexual behavior appropriate for the em-
ployment setting.5 Such acknowledgment has resulted in the 
creation and implementation of the reasonable victim/woman 
standard.6 
Since 1987, beginning with Yates v. Avco Corp., the rea-
sonable woman standard (hereinafter "RWS") has gradually 
gained acceptance by the judiciary.7 The RWS, which is pre-
mised on the theory that males and females perceive sexual 
behavior differently, deems actionable that conduct which 
offends and intimidates a reasonable woman, including sexual 
conduct which some males may not find objectionable. The 
adoption of the RWS, therefore, has allowed women to estab-
4. The following Federal Circuit Courts have adopted a reasonable vic-
tim/woman standard. See, e.g., Newton v. Dept. of Air Force, 85 F.3d 595 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996) (adopting a reasonable victim standard); Burns v. McGregor Electronic 
Industries, 989 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (adopting a reasonable woman standard); 
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (adopting a reasonable woman 
standard); Jones v. Dept. of Army, 780 F.Supp. 755 (10th Cir. 1993) (adopting a 
reasonable woman standard); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 
(11th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable woman); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 
630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting a reasonable woman standard). The following 
Federal Circuit Courts have adopted a reasonable person standard. See, e.g., 
Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 1995) (adopting a 
reasonable person standard); Trotta v. Mobil Oil Corp., 788 F.Supp. 1336 (2nd Cir. 
1992) (adopting a reasonable person standard); Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 
147 (5th Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable person standard as opposed to a rea-
sonable "church affiliated" person standard); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 
F.Supp. 1509 (lst Cir. 1991) (utilizing the "reasonable person from the protected 
group of which the victim is a member" standard). 
5. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Rabidue v. 
Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J. dissenting). 
6. Because this note focuses primarily on sexual harassment directed at wom-
en, the terms "reasonable victim" and "reasonable woman" are used interchange-
ably. 
7. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Ellison v. 
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 
F.Supp. 1509 (1st Cir. 1991) (adopting a reasonable victim standard); Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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lish prima facie hostile environment claims that would have 
been held insufficient under the traditional reasonable person 
standard (hereinafter "RPS").8 
The Michigan Supreme Court's decision to explicitly reject 
the RWS in Radtke v. Everett9 illustrates an unwillingness by 
some courts to accept this progressive instrument of sexual 
harassment jurisprudence. This comment will analyze and 
critique the Radtke court's rationale for rejecting the RWS in 
favor of the RPS. 
Part II of this comment will discuss both the history of 
sexual harassment and the evolution of the reasonable woman 
standard in order. to illustrate society's progress toward defin-
ing appropriate conduct in the work environment.1o Parts 111-
IV will present the Radtke court's argument rejecting the rea-
sonable woman standard in favor of the reasonable person 
standard.ll Part V invokes feminist theory to critique the pre-
mises upon which the Radtke rationale is based.12 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section illustrates how both the legislatures' and the 
courts' interpretation of sexual harassment have evolved to 
prohibit various forms of sexual behavior in the workplace. 
Part A discusses briefly the history of sexual harassment law. 
Part B discusses the evolution of the reasonable woman stan-
dard and how this standard has expanded the protective ambit 
of Title VII to include sexual conduct which was not actionable 
under a reasonable person standard. 
8. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991). The District 
Court, using the reasonable person standard, granted the employer's motion for 
summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, using the reasonable woman standard, 
held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual 
harassment. 
9. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993). 
10. See infra part II. 
11. See infra parts III-IV. 
12. See infra part V. 
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A. HISTORY OF SEXUAL HARAsSMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
Responding to society's need to equalize opportunities for 
all persons within the work force, Congress included gender as 
a classification protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 (hereinafter ''Title VII").13 Under Title VII, an employ-
er shall not discriminate against an individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex [em-
phasis added], or national origin."14 Title VII has eliminated a 
wide range of impediments to gender equality in the 
workplace, including inaccurately validated tests,15 seniority 
systems,16 and gender-based height and weight standards. 17 
The federal courts, however, have experienced great difficulty 
in applying Title VII's language to sexual harassment. 18 
In the early and mid-1970's, the federal courts dismissed 
cases alleging sexual harassment on the grounds that sexual 
harassment did not constitute a violation of Title VII. 19 For 
13. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 703, amended by, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (1970 & Supp. II 1972). In relevant part the Act provides: 
[d. 
14. [d. 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge an 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against an individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. 
15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
16. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 658-59 (2nd Cir. 
1971). 
17. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, 366 F.Supp. 763, 790 (D.D.C. 1974), affd in 
part and reversed in part, No. 74-1791 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 20, 1976). 
18. See, e.g., Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (1977) (reversed and remanded 
the lower court's holding that employment conditioned upon acquiescence to sexual 
requests does not fall within the coverage of Title VII); Corne v. Bausch and 
Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161 (1975) (holding that Title VII does not protect a fe-
male employee from a supervisor's repeated verbal and physical sexual advances). 
19. Kathleen McKinney & Nick Maroules, Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL Co-
4
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example, in Barnes v. Train20, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that a supervisor's 
retaliation against a female employee who refused his sexual 
advances was "underpinned by the subtleties of an inharmoni-
ous personal relationship."21 The Barnes court reasoned that 
the supervisor acted independently of his company's policies, 
and therefore, his actions did not create an arbitrary barrier to 
continued employment based on gender.22 The court therefore 
held that Title VII was inapplicable. 
Similarly, in Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., the court 
held that a supervisor's repeated verbal and physical advances 
were nothing more than a "personal proclivity, peculiarity, or 
mannerism" and that he was satisfying a "personal urge. "23 
The court reasoned that Title VII applies only when the em-
ployer itself practiced the discrimination. The Corne court held 
that even a supervisor's harassment was not actionable be-
cause such conduct had no relationship to the nature of the 
employment.24 
Williams v. Saxbe was the fIrst federal court decision to 
recognize sexual harassment as a Title VII violation.25 In this 
case, a supervisor retaliated against a female employee's refus-
al of his sexual advances by subjecting her to unwarranted 
reprimands, unfavorable reviews, and ultimately to termina-
tion.26 Holding that the supervisor's conduct constituted sexu-
al discrimination within the defInition of Title VII, the court 
stated,"[t]he conduct of the plaintiff's supervisor created an 
artifIcial barrier to employment which was placed before one 
gender and not the other .... "27 The holding in Williams sug-
gested that Title VII would provide a remedy for women who· 
suffered tangible losses (e.g. termination, unfavorable reviews) 
ERCION 30 (Elizabeth Grauerholz, Mary Koralewski eds., 1991). 
20. Id. 
21. Barnes v. Train, Civ. No. 1828-73 (D.D.C.) (order of Aug. 9, 1974). 
22. McKinney, supra note 19 at 30. 
23. Corne v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F.Supp. 161, 163 (1975) 
24. Id. 
25. McKinney, supra note 19 at 30; see, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654 
(D.C. Cir. 1976). 
26. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
27. [d. at 657. 
5
Dumont: Reasonable Woman Standard
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
260 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:255 
as a result of sexual harassment.28 The Williams holding, 
however, only addressed an actual or constructive discharge of 
an employee, and left open the question of whether a harasser 
who engages "merely" in intimidating or offensive behavior 
toward his victim has violated Title VII. 
In 1980, in an effort to reduce ambiguity in sexual harass-
ment adjudication, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission drafted guidelines for the purpose of defining behavior 
constituting sexual harassment.29 The guidelines describe the 
types of workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title 
VII, namely "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment. "30 Quid 
pro quo sexual harassment exists when the sexual misconduct 
of the employer or his agent is directly related to the grant or 
denial of a tangible economic benefit to an employee.31 A "hos-
tile environment" exists where "such conduct has the purpose 
or effect of reasonably interfering with an individual's work 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
work environment."32 Although these guidelines are not con-
trolling upon the courts, federal and state courts, as well as 
state legislatures have looked to them for guidance.33 
In 1981, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
in Bundy v. Jackson, interpreting Title VII, held that a "hostile 
environment" existed when a plaintiff was subjected to sexual-
ly stereotyped insults and demeaning propositions which 
caused her anxiety and debilitation.34 In Bundy, not only was 
the plaintiff the target of numerous sexual advances by her 
first line supervisors, but when she complained about these 
advances to management, the supervisor dismissed her com-
plaints and told her that "any man in his right mind would 
28. The court was unable to provide plaintiff with a remedy as the parties did 
not address what specific relief was appropriate. [d. at 663. 
29. In defIning "sexual harassment," the Guidelines fIrst describe the kinds of 
workplace conduct that may be actionable under Title VII. These include 
"[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature." Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 65 (1986), (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604. l1(a». 
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1604. 11(a)(3). 
31. [d. 
32. [d. 
33. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
34. Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
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want to rape you. "35 The Bundy court found that such state-
ments adversely affected the psychological and emotional work 
environment.36 The Bundy court analogized such intimidating 
and offensive language to ethnic and racial discrimination 
which indisputably pollutes the work environment, but does 
not necessarily result in the loss of any tangible economic 
benefit.37 Relying on the Fifth Circuit's holding that racial 
slurs violate Title VII, the Bundy court concluded that sexual 
harassment "which injects the most demeaning stereotypes 
into the general work environment" violated Title VIl3s The 
Bundy holding indicated that the federal courts were willing to 
apply Title VII prohibitions to verbal abuse based on gender.39 
In 1986, the United States Supreme Court invoked the 
hostile environment category of Title VII in Mentor Savings 
Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 40 In Meritor, the Court relied on the 
EEOC guidelines in addition to lower court decisions in con-
cluding that "Title VII affords employees the right to work in 
an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, 
and insult."41 Quoting from Henson v. Dundee, a decision of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 
the Court stated that "[s]exual harassment which creates a 
hostile or offensive environment for members of one sex is 
every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the 
workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. "42 The 
Mentor Court recognized that not all workplace conduct that 
35. ld. at 940. 
36.ld. 
37. ld. at 945; see, Rogers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n, 454 F.2d 
234, (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Judge Goldberg explained: 
ld. at 238. 
. . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment is an 
expansive concept which sweeps within its protective 
ambit the practice of creating a work environment 
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination ... [olne can 
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted 
with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional 
and psychological stability of minority group workers. 
38. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945. 
39. ld. at 946. 
40. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57. 
41. ld. at 67. 
42. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 
(11th Cir. 1982». 
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may be described as harassment affects a term or condition of 
employment.43 The Court stated that for hostile environment 
sexual harassment to be actionable, the defendant's behavior 
must be sufficiently severe or pervasive "to alter the conditions 
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working 
environment."44 The Court, however, did not articulate a stan-
dard for determining whether a defendant's behavior created 
such a hostile work environment. 
The history of sexual harassment jurisprudence demon-
strates that the judiciary has interpreted more broadly the 
conduct prohibited under Title VII. The next section will dis-
cuss how the introduction of the RWS to sexual harassment 
adjudication has even further expanded the scope of Title VII 
protection. 
B. HISTORY OF THE REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD 
In late 1986, five months after Meritor was decided, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decided 
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. 45 Ms. Rabidue claimed that a 
co-worker's propensity to refer to women as "whores," "cunts," . 
and other derogatory obscenities, in addition to the display of 
sexually explicit posters throughout the facility, created a hos-
tile work environment.45 The majority applied a reasonable 
person standard and held that the evidence, even when viewed 
in a light most favorable to Rabidue, did not demonstrate that 
"this single employee's vulgarity substantially affected the 
totality of the workplace. JJ47 The court characterized the con-
duct Rabidue complained of as merely a legitimate expression 
of the cultural norms of the workers, and that the prevailing 
depictions of women in the media suggested that such conduct 
was not unreasonably offensive.48 
43. [d. at 67; see Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("mere 
utterances of an ethnic or racial epithet which engender offensive feelings in an 
employee" would not affect the conditions of employment to sufficiently significant 
degree to violate Title VII). 
44. [d. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, supra note 43 at 38). 
45. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). 
46. Rabidue. 805 F.2d at 623-24. 
47. [d. at 622. 
48. [d. The majority stated: 
8
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In Rabidue, Judge Keith dissented and proposed a stan-
dard of review based on the perspective of a reasonable victim 
in determining the severity of the defendant's conduct. Judge 
Keith stated that "the reasonable person perspective fails to 
account for the wide divergence between most women's views 
of appropriate sexual conduct and those of men."49 Judge 
Keith stated that the reasonable victim standard would allow 
courts to consider "salient sociological differences as well as 
shield employers from the neurotic complainant."50 Judge 
Keith also rejected the majority's reasonable person standard 
as "enforcing an essentially male viewpoint under the guise of 
universality,"51 by which the courts determine reasonableness 
based upon prevailing social norms. 52 
The Rabidue opinion is noteworthy because the holding 
illustrates the limitations of the RPS in defining harassing 
~onduct. 53 The Rabidue majority, by focusing on whether the 
defendant's conduct violated prevailing social norms, ignored 
the possibility that our social norms reflect a male perspective 
of what constitutes appropriate sexual behavior in the 
workplace.54 The majority's analysis provided a vivid example 
of how the RPS reinforces cultural norms that perpetuate in-
equality in the workplace. Furthermore, Rabidue illustrates 
how the outcome of a sexual harassment case can be deter-
mined by the standard adopted by the court. 55 
Id. 
In the case at bar, the record effectively disclosed that 
Henry's obscenities, although annoying, were not so star-
tling as to have affected seriously the psyches of the 
plaintiff or other female employees. .. [t]he sexually 
oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the 
plaintift's work environment when considered in the con-
text of a society that condones and publicly features and 
commercially exploits open displays of written and pictori-
al erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at 
the cinema, and in other public places. 
49. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626. 
50.Id. 
51. See also, Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of 
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1196 (1990). 
52. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626. 
53. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Rea-
sonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1193-94 (1990). 
54. Id. at 1205. 
55. See also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). The Court of 
9
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In the 1987 case of Yates v. Avco Corp., the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit, the same circuit that decided 
Rabidue, adopted the reasonable victim standard in determin-
ing whether a constructive discharge resulted from a hostile 
work environment. 56 The Yates court recognized that men and 
women interpret offensive or intimidating behavior in different 
ways.57 The court held that the severity of the defendant's 
conduct should be viewed from the perspective of the reason-
able person "standing in the shoes of the employee."58 The 
court reasoned that the RWS should be applied since the plain-
tiff in this type of case has been discriminated against based 
solely upon gender.59 
In 1991, in Ellison v. Brady, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explicitly adopted the perspective 
of a reasonable woman for determining whether the 
defendant's conduct was actionable under Title VII.60 In that 
case, Kerry Ellison, an agent for the IRS, received two "love 
notes" in which a co-worker declared his romantic feelings in a 
bizarre manner that frightened Ellison.61 The Ellison court 
relied on the EEOC guidelines and on lower court decisions 
advocating focus on the victim's perspective in determining 
whether the defendant's conduct had created a hostile work 
environment.62 The Ellison court found that a reasonable per-
son standard is not only an insufficient standard for defining 
unacceptable behavior in the workplace, but a standard that 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable woman standard and under 
this standard reversed and remanded the trial court's order granting summary 
judgment for the defendant. 
56. Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987). 
57. ld. The court stated "were this a sexual harassment case involving a male 
subordinate, the 'reasonable man' should be applied. We acknowledge that men 
and women are vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior." 
ld. 
58.ld. 
59.ld. 
60. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991). 
61. ld. at 874. 
62. EEOC Compliance Manual (CCH) § 615, para. 3112, C at 3242 (1988) 
(courts "should consider the victim's perspective and not stereotyped notions of 
acceptable behavior"). See, Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(adopting "reasonable woman" standard advocated by the dissent in Rabidue). Cr., 
State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash.2d 221, 239-41 (1977) (en banc) (adopting reasonable 
woman standard for self-defense). 
10
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may condone the behavior Title VII aims to eliminate.63 
The court reasoned that women collectively share common 
concerns regarding sexual behavior of which many men are 
unaware.64 For example, the fact that women are 
disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault suggests 
that women may reasonably believe that a harasser's mild 
behavior may foreshadow a violent act.65 The Ellison court 
stated that a reasonable person standard ignores the sociologi-
cal experiences of women while it incorporates the perspective 
of males who represent the majority of perpetrators.66 
Each citing Ellison, seven of the twelve federal circuits 
have since adopted the reasonable victim standard when ana-
lyzing the severity of sexual harassment.67 Three circuits have 
adopted the reasonable person standard68 while the other two 
have not committed to either standard.s9 The adoption of the 
RWS suggests that our society is willing to reconsider the 
types of behavior that it will tolerate in the work environment. 
Due to the federal courts' decision to consider sexual behavior 
from the perspective of the victim, employers have been alerted 
that discrimination can result from abusive or offensive lan-
guage,70 or from conduct (such as posting pornography) that 
stigmatizes women as sexual objects.71 The reasonable victim 
standard allows courts to eradicate the more subtle, but equal-
ly discriminatory, forms of sexual harassment that place artifi-
cial barriers before one gender and not the other.72 
63. Ellison, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 
64. [d. at 879; see, Ehrenreich, supra note 51 at 1207 ("[M]any men ... tend 
to view the milder forms of harassment such as suggestive looks, repeated re-
quests for dates, and sexist jokes, as harmless social interactions to which only 
sensitive women would object"). 
65. [d. 
66. [d.; see, Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of 
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1203 (1989) (discussing how many re-
cent judicial opinions reflect a tendency by judges to adopt a "male" view regard-
ing sexual conduct in the workplace). 
67. See supra note 4. 
68. See, e.g., Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., 50 F.3d 428 (7th Cir. 
1995); Trotta v. Mobile Oil Corp., 788 F.Supp. 1336 (2nd Cir. 1992); Murray v. 
City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991). 
69. Neither the Third nor the Fourth Circuit have considered the issue. 
70. See, Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). 
71. See, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (11th Cir. 1991). 
72. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard 
11
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In 1993, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the United 
States Supreme Court addressed the question regarding the 
standard to be employed in assessing harassing conduct.73 In 
Harris, the Court unanimously held that Teresa Harris was 
not required to demonstrate that the harassing conduct of 
which she complained had "seriously affected her psychological 
well-being."74 While the Court did use the term reasonable 
person in discussing the appropriate standard, a subsequent 
sentence suggests that the Supreme Court has not ruled out 
the possibility of adopting a reasonable victim standard. "So 
long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is 
perceived, as hostile or abusive, there is no need for it also to 
be psychologically injurious. "76 The language "reasonably be 
perceived" does not necessarily preclude a reasonable victim 
standard as it implies a standard adopting the victim's per-
spective. 
Furthermore, the Harris Court listed the following factors 
to be considered when evaluating the circumstances of a hos-
tile environment, including the frequency and severity of the 
conduct, whether the conduct is "physically threatening or 
humiliating," and whether it "unreasonably interferes with an 
employee's work performance."76 Such factors suggest further 
that a reasonable woman standard is appropriate. For exam-
ple, a female is more likely to be feel physically threatened 
than a male under similar' circumstances due to the disparity 
in Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1400 (1992); See also 
Ehrenreich supra note 51 at 1219. 
73. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993). 
74. The U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
1d. at 302. 
75.1d. 
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one 
that does not seriously affect employees' psychological 
well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the 
job, or keep them from advancing in their careers. 
76. 1d. The U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
1d. at 303. 
The effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of 
course, relevant to determining whether the plaintiff actu-
ally found the environment abusive. But while psychologi-
cal harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken 
into account, no single factor is required. 
12
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in size and strength that exists between males and females. 77 
As the Court did not address directly the issue of whether a 
reasonable woman standard should be adopted, the issue was 
left open to future litigation and debate.7s 
III. RADTKE v. EVERETr 
The Michigan Supreme Court in Radtke v. Everett express-
ly rejected both the efficacy and the validity of the RWS, hold-
ing that a RWS was not only unnecessary to sexual harass-
ment adjudication, but antithetical to the intent of the Michi-
gan Civil Rights Act.79 Part A will discuss the facts and proce-
dural history of the Radtke decision. Part B will discuss the 
Radtke Court's analysis and reasoning behind its decision to 
reject the RWS. 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Plaintiff Tamara Radtke was employed as an unregistered 
veterinary technician for defendant Clarke-Everett Dog and 
Cat Hospital, P.C., beginning January, 1984.80 On Sunday, 
May 29, 1988, Radtke, as commonly occurred,' was working 
alone with defendant Everett to provide weekend emergency 
veterinarian services. SI When Radtke suggested that she and 
Everett take a break, Everett joined her in the hospital's 
lounge and sat down next to her on the sofa. S2 Radtke be-
lieved Everett's behavior was inappropriate and attempted to 
77. See Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace 
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1183, 1205 (1989). The author explains: 
Id. 
While many women hold positive attitudes about 
uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social vulnerabil-
ity to sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual 
encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised 
in a society where rape and sex-related violence have 
reached unprecedented levels, and a vast pornography 
industry creates continuous images of sexual coercion, 
objectification and violence. 
78. See, e.g., Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (1993). 
79. Id. at 166-67. 
80. Id. at 159. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
13
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get up from the couch. Everett restrained her by firmly placing 
his arm around her neck and holding her down.83 After she 
forcefully escaped his grip, Radtke rebuffed Everett's further 
advances by stating: "You don't want to do this. I don't want to 
do this. You're married. I'm married."84 When Everett re-
sponded by caressing Radtke's neck, Radtke again protested, 
but Everett ignored her pleas.85 Everett tried to kiss Radtke 
by grabbing her neck and pushing his face toward hers.86 
Radtke successfully pushed Everett away, and the working day 
was finished without further incident.87 
In December 1988, Radtke filed a civil suit against Everett 
and the hospital in the Grand Traverse Circuit COurt.88 
Radtke alleged that she was (1) sexually harassed in violation 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; 2) constructively discharged on 
the basis of sex; 3) the victim of assault and battery; and 4) 
denied access to her personnel files in violation of the Employ-
ee Right to Know Act, M.C.L. section 423.501 et seq.; M.S.A. 
section 17.62(1) et seq.89 Radtke's sexual harassment claim 
was based on the theory that Everett's actions had created a 
hostile work environment under Title VII.90 
The trial court dismissed the Employee Right to Know Act 
claim by stipulation.91 In August, 1989, the trial court granted 
defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the remaining 
countS.92 The trial court ruled that Radtke failed to state a 
violation of the Michigan Civil Rights Act because her hostile 
environment claim was based upon a single incident of sexual 
harassment, which as a matter oflaw, did "not rise to the level 
of severity and persistence which would permit recovery. ~3 
The trial court also dismissed Radtke's constructive discharge 
claim because it was dependent on a finding of a hostile work 
83. [d. 
84. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 159. 
85. [d. 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160. 
89. [d. 
90. [d. 
91. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160. 
92. [d. 
93. [d. 
14
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environment.94 The court also ruled that Radtke's assault and 
battery claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Worker's Disability Compensation Act.95 
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on all countS.96 
Regarding the hostile environment claim, the court, sua spon-
te, rejected the Michigan judiciary's precedent of using a rea-
sonable person standard in making the determination whether 
a hostile work environment existed.97 The Court of Appeals 
found that under the reasonable woman standard, Radtke's 
"single incident could be sufficiently severe under some circum-
stances to support a finding" of a hostile work environment.98 
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the Court of 
Appeals' holding that Radtke had alleged a prima facie case of 
a hostile work environment.99 The Court, however, rejected 
the lower court's use of the reasonable woman standard. loo 
The Court held that the appropriate standard to be used in 
determining a hostile work environment was the "objective" 
reasonable person standard, and that the "gender conscious" 
reasonable woman standard was ''violative of the legislative 
intent of the act, undermine[d] uniform standards of conduct, 
and [was] ultimately unnecessary."IOI 
B. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
While the Michigan Supreme Court held that Radtke had 
made a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, the Court rejected the Court of Appeal's adoption of the 
RWS. First, this section will discuss the Michigan Supreme 
Court's analysis of Radtke's hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claim. Second, this section will discuss the Michigan 
Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting the RWS. 
94. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160. 
95. [d. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. [d. 
99. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 168. 
100. [d. at 160. 
101. [d. at 169. 
15
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1. Radtke's Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claim 
The Michigan Supreme Court began its analysis by looking 
to the Michigan Civil Rights Act, which states that conduct or 
communication of a sexual nature constitutes sexual discrimi-
nation when "such conduct or communication has the purpose 
or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's em-
ployment . .. or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offen-
sive . . . environment. »102 The court then laid out the five ele-
ments necessary to establish a prima facie case for hostile 
work environment: 1) the employee belonged to a protected 
group; 2) the employee was subjected to communication or 
conduct on the basis of sex; 3) the employee was subjected to 
unwelcome sexual conduct or communication; 4) the unwel-
come sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in 
fact did substantially interfere with the employee's employ-
ment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work 
environment; and 5) respondeat superior. 103 
The court found that Radtke's claim satisfied the first 
three elements of the test. 104 The court also held that Radtke 
satisfied the fifth element of the test. 105 The court thus 
framed as its key issue the question of whether the facts of 
this case supported the fourth prong of the test.106 The court 
was required to determine whether Everett "intended to or in 
fact did substantially interfere with the employee's employ-
ment or created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work 
102. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 162 (quoting M.S.A § 3.548(101)(h)(iii». 
103. M.S.A. §§ 3.548(103)(h), 3.548(202)(1)(a). 
104. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 162-63 (Mich. 1993). Radtke met the 
fll'8t element of the action because Radtke, a female, was a member of a protected 
class. Radtke met the second element because she showed that but for the fact of 
her gender, she would not have been the object of harassment. The defendant, a 
heterosexual male, stipulated that his conduct was an "innocent romantic over-
ture." Radtke met the third element as she provided sufficient evidence that the 
sexual conduct was unwelcome. 1d. 
105. 1d. at 168. The court held that the respondent superior element of the test 
was met by Radtke because the alleged perpetrator was her employer. Everett had 
the power to hire and fire Radtke and to control her working environment. 
Everett also paid her wages and owned the corporation employing Radtke. 1d. at 
169. 
106. 1d. at 163. 
16
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environment. "107 The trial court held that Radtke had failed 
to satisfy the fourth prong of the test; a single incident of sexu-
al harassment, as matter of law, did "not rise to the level of se-
verity and persistence which would permit recovery."lOB 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's holding 
regarding not only the fourth prong of the test, but as to all 
countS.109 The Court of Appeals adopted and applied a rea-
sonable woman standard to determine whether a hostile work 
environment existed.110 Under the RWS, the court held that 
"a single incident could be sufficiently severe under some cir-
cumstances to support a finding" of a hostile work environ-
ment. III The court concluded that the evidence presented by 
Radtke satisfied all five prongs of the test and therefore was 
sufficient to pennit a trial regarding the issue of a hostile work 
environment. 112 
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected the Court of 
Appeal's adoption of the RWS and reaffinned the application of 
the RPS. u3 Nonetheless, the Court did find that Radtke had 
satisfied the fourth prong of the hostile environment test. 114 
The Court held that a single incident of sexual harassment 
could be sufficient to constitute a violation of the Michigan 
Civil Rights Act if the incident was extremely traumatic, as in 
the case of a rape or violent sexual assault.u5 Under the facts 
107. Id. at 162. 
108. Radtke v. Everett, Circuit Court for the County of Grand Traverse, Deci-
sion and Order on defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition, August 11, 
1989, p. 2. 
109. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 160. 
110. rd. (quoting Radtke v. Everett 189 Mich. App. 346, 355 (1991». The Court 
of Appeals stated: 
rd. 
[A] female plaintiff states an actionable claim for sex 
discrimination caused by hostile-environment sexual ha-
rassment under the state Civil Rights Act where she 
alleges conduct of a sexual nature that a reasonable per-
son would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of employment by creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive employment environment. 
111. Radtke v. Everett, 189 Mich. App. 346, 356 (1991). 
112. Radtke, 510 N.W.2d at 160. 
113. rd. at 167. 
114. rd. at 168. 
115. Id; see, del Valle Fontanez v. Aponte, 660 F.Supp. 145, 149 (D.P.R. 1987); 
17
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of the instant case, the Court held that Radtke had presented 
evidence of an incident of sufficient severity to pennit a jury 
trial. U6 The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the ruling of 
the Court of Appeals that Radtke had alleged a prima facie 
case of a hostile work environment. 117 
2. The Radtke Court's Rationale for Rejecting the Reasonable 
Woman Standard. 
The Radtke court acknowledged that the standard to be 
used in detennining the existence of a hostile work environ-
ment has been subject to debate. us Therefore, the court ad-
dressed the validity of adopting a RWS to detennine the exis-
tence of a hostile work environment. Relying on the language 
and the purpose of the Michigan Civil Rights Act (hereinafter 
"MCRA" or "the Act"), the court rejected a RWS. u9 
First, the court held that the plain meaning of the MCRA 
mandated the use of an objective reasonableness standard. 120 
In its analysis the court referred to Webster's Third Interna-
tional Dictionary to define the words "hostile," "intimidating," 
and "offensive." Without any further explanation, the court 
held that a close reading of the definitions mandated an objec-
tive examination of the reasonableness of the defendant's con-
Vermett v. Hough, 627 F.Supp. 587, 605-606 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (stating "the re-
quirement for repeated exposure will vary inversely with the severity of the offen-
siveness of the incident"). 
[d. 
116. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 168. The court stated: 
The alleged conduct, combined with the reality that the 
employer was the perpetrator, permits the single incident 
to be sufficient to reach the jury. Although the same 
conduct perpetrated by a coworker might not constitute a 
hostile work environment, when an employee in a closely 
knit working environment restrains an employee and 
physically attempts to coerce sexual relations, the totality 
of the circumstances permits the jury to determine wheth-
er defendant's conduct was sufficient to have created a 
hostile work environment. 
117. [d. at 170. 
118. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 164. 
119. [d.; see, M.C.L. § 37.2103(h); M.S.A. § 3.548(103)(h). 
120. [d.; see subsection 103(hXiii) which states "Such conduct or communication 
has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with an individual's employ-
ment ... or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive ... environment." [d. 
18
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [1997], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol27/iss2/5
1997] REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD 273 
duct as such terms are determined primarily by objective fac-
tors.12l The court, therefore, concluded that the requisite ob-
jectivity could only be attained under the RPS.122 
Second, the court noted how Anglo-American jurisprudence 
had applied a RPS for well over a century before the adoption 
of the MCRA.123 The court reasoned that if the legislature in-
tended a departure from that standard, it certainly would have 
explicitly mandated that alteration. 124 
Third, the court reasoned that a RPS should be applied 
because it is sufficiently flexible to incorporate gender differ-
ences,125 enabling the trier of fact "to look to a community 
standard rather than an individual one. "126 The court rea-
soned that a RPS considered the "totality of the circumstanc-
es," and was therefore flexible enough to incorporate gender as 
a factor without jeopardizing the stability of uniform stan-
dards. 127 
Fourth, the court further supported its adoption of a RPS 
by criticizing the objectivity of a RWS. The court reasoned that 
only a RPS will prevent hypersensitive plaintiffs from recover-
ing.128 The court stated: "[t]he alternative to an objective 
standard would be to accept all plaintiffs' subjective evalua-
tions of conduct, thereby imposing upon an employer liability 
for behavior that, for idiosyncratic reasons, is offensive to an 
employee. "129 
The court further reasoned that a gender-conscious stan-
dard (e.g. RWS) unduly emphasizes gender and inappropriately 
focuses on a particular plaintiff while it concomitantly under-
mines society's need for uniform standards of conduct.13o The 
121. [d. 
122. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 164. 
123. [d. at 165. 
124. [d. at 166. 
125. [d. 
126. [d. 
127. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 166. 
128. [d. at 165. 
129. [d. at 164. 
130. [d. at 166. 
19
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court decided that "a gender-conscious standard eliminates 
community standards and replaces them with standards for-
mulated by a subset of the community."13l The court reasoned 
that acceptance of a gender-conscious standard would lead to 
the fragmentation of legal standards to the detriment of soci-
ety.132 The court stated that "a multitude of ethnic groups, 
national origins, religions, races, cultures, as well as divergenc-
es in wealth and education, would demand as many stan-
dards. ,,133 
The court summed up its reasoning by declaring that a 
gender-conscious standard is contrary to the intent of the 
MCRA.l34 The court stated that a gender-conscious standard 
could reinforce the very sexist attitudes the Act is attempting 
to counter.135 The court declared that a RPS is permeated by 
stereotypical assumptions of women which suggest that women 
are sensitive, fragile, and in need of a more protective stan-
dard.136 The court concluded its argument by insisting that 
"distinguishing women for special protection puts them back in 
the disadvantaged position which led to the need for special 
protection in the fIrst place. ,,137 
IV. CRITIQUE 
In Radtke, the Michigan Supreme Court expressly rejected 
the rationale used by many federal courts for adopting a 
RWS. I38 Courts adopting a RWS have acknowledged the va-
lidity of sociological research that demonstrates that males and 
females interpret sexual behavior differently. 139 Therefore 
131. [d. 
132. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 166. 
133. [d. at 167. 
134. [d. 
135. [d. 
136. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167. 
137. [d.; see Dragel, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Should the Ninth 
Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard be Adopted?, 11 J. L. & COM. 237, 254 
(1992) (suggesting that the reasonable woman standard may reinforce the notion 
that women are "different" from men and therefore need special treatment - a 
notion that has disenfranchised women in the workplace). 
138. Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 165 (1993); see supra note 4. 
139. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Robinson v. 
Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F.Supp. 1486 (11th Cir. 1991); Yates v. Avco Corp., 
20
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those courts have extended the protective ambit of Title VII to 
behavior which offends a reasonable woman, but may not nec-
essarily offend a reasonable man. 14O This section will critique 
the Radtke court's reasoning to show that while the RPS is, in 
the abstract, sufficiently flexible to incorporate gender as a 
factor, the RWS provides a more accurate reflection of society's 
evolving recognition that males and females interpret sexual 
behavior differently. 
When the Michigan Supreme Court held that a RWS was 
neither workable nor even necessary, it asserted that a RPS is 
both an objective and effective standard for determining action-
able conduct under Title VII. 141 The majority opinion implies 
that sexual behavior is actionable under Title VII only when a 
reasonable woman and a reasonable man would find that such 
behavior adversely affected the work environment. 142 The 
thirty year history of sexual harassment jurisprudence, howev-
er, illustrates how our society has gradually and necessarily 
expanded its interpretation of sexual harassment to include be-
819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987). 
140. See, e.g., Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of 
Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1205 (1989). The author states: 
Id. 
While many women hold positive attitudes about 
uncoerced sex, their greater physical and social vulnerabil-
ity to sexual coercion can make women wary of sexual 
encounters. Moreover, American women have been raised 
in a society where rape and sex-related violence have 
reached unprecedented levels, and a vast pornography 
industry creates continuous images of sexual coercion, 
objectification and violence. Finally, women as a group 
tend to hold more restrictive views of both the situation 
and type of relationship in which sexual conduct is appro-
priate. 
141. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Rea-
sonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1234 (1990) (stating 
"the prevailing ideology systematically ignores differences among the citizenry as a 
whole, promoting a homogeneous vision of American society that both excludes 
those groups who do not fit the accepted American model and elevates a small but 
powerful elite to the status of universal 'type'). 
142. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167; see Dragel, Hostile Environment Sexual Ha-
rassment: Should the Ninth Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard be Adopted?, 
11 J. L. & COM. 237, 254 (1992) (stating that "[w]omen's experiences should be 
encompassed under a 'reasonable person' and not merely a 'reasonable woman' 
standard. Under an expanded notion of reasonable personhood, a victim's gender 
would be but one factor the court considers."). 
21
Dumont: Reasonable Woman Standard
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997
276 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27:255 
havior that degrades and offends women even if men would not 
be similarly affected. l43 The Radtke decision, by rejecting 
such an expansion, fosters and maintains a body of law which 
recognizes only the most egregious forms of sexual harassment. 
This section will draw upon feminist theory in presenting 
a counter argument to the Radtke court's rationale for rejecting 
both the validity and the necessity of a RWS. The author will 
demonstrate that the decision of whether or not to adopt a 
RWS is much more complex than the Radtke court represents. 
To end gender discrimination in the workplace, our legal stan-
dards must consider the perspective of the harassment victim, 
not merely the perspective of those who engage in harass-
ment.l44 
Although the Radtke court lists five reasons for rejecting a 
RWS in favor of adopting the reasonable person standard, the 
court's rationale is based on only two premises. The first prem-
ise is that a RPS is objective, capable of accounting for differ-
ences within any given community. The Radtke opinion's first 
three reasons for rejecting the RWS (i.e., the plain meaning of 
the Act dictates the use of RPS, stare decisis requires use of a 
RPS, and the RPS is sufficiently flexible to account for gender 
differences) are based on the first premise. The second premise 
is that a RWS is patently subjective, harmful not only to the 
uniformity of the judicial system, but to the status of women in 
society. The Radtke court's last two reasons for rejecting the 
RWS (i.e., the RWS is unworkable, and the RWS harms 
women's position in society) are based on the second premise. 
A. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD 
IS QUESTIONABLE 
The Radtke court's first three arguments advocating the 
RPS are based upon the premise that the RPS is an objective 
standard, a standard that reflects the acceptable social norms 
143. See supra part II. 
144. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated "If we 
only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in allegedly harassing 
conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimina-
tion." [d. at 878. See, e.g., Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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for workplace conduct. Unfortunately, the plain meaning argu-
ment and the stare decisis argument simply assume, without 
discussion or textual support, that the RPS is indeed objec-
tive. l45 This assumption is disturbing in light of recent schol-
arship challenging the objectivity of judicial definitions of rea-
sonableness. l46 Furthermore, this assumption of objectivity is 
further suspect when one considers the holding of Rabidue v. 
Osceola Refining Co. in which the court, applying a RPS, held 
that a co-worker's misogynist obscenities combined with an 
abundance of nude pictorials of women posted around the office 
did not constitute a hostile environment for the plaintiff.147 If 
the Radtke court has determined that the RPS is indeed suffi-
ciently objective to further the goals of Title VII, then its rea-
soning should more comprehensively address the valid ques-
tions and concerns raised by critics of the RPS. l46 
Regarding the third argument, the flexibility argument, 
the court states that the RPS is "sufficiently flexible" to incor-
porate gender differences. 149 The court reasoned that the RPS 
has been carefully formulated in order to provide one standard 
of conduct for society.15o This is one of the court's stronger 
arguments advocating the objectivity of the RPS, for some 
commentators have suggested that the RPS is capable of syn-
thesizing community standards.151 The court's advocacy of the 
145. See supra part IV. 
146. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Rea-
sonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990) (stating 
that "judicial definitions of reasonableness often reflect the values and assumptions 
of a narrow elite"); Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1105-21 (1986) ("reasonable 
resistance" necessary to establish rape is often defined as requiring physical resis-
tance more typical of a man than a woman); Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for 
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 623, 631-
32 (1980) (reasonableness standard in self-defense law restricting the use of deadly 
weapons to situations in which the attacker is armed ignores the fact that many 
women are unable to defend themselves from men without the advantage of a 
weapon). 
147. See supra part II. 
148. See supra note 146. 
149. Id. 
150. PROSSER AND KEETON, TORTS (5th ed.), § 32, 173-75. The commentators 
state: "The standard of conduct which the community demands must be an exter-
nal and objective one, rather than the individual judgment, good or bad, of the 
particular actor; and it must be, so far as possible, the same for all persons, since 
the law can have no favorites." Id. 
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 283, cmt. c, 13. The commentators 
23
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RPS, however, remains suspect in light of legal and sociological 
scholarship. 152 
Feminist theorists have challenged the objectivity of the 
RPS, reasoning that judicial definitions of reasonableness often 
reflect the beliefs and values of a narrow elite.153 Some com-
mentators have asserted that the RPS is nothing more than a 
politically correct version of the reasonable man standard. 154 
Furthermore, feminist critics have even challenged the objec-
tivity of the term "reasonable."155 Indeed, in our male-domi-
nated society, it is certainly possible that our conception of 
reasonableness is gendered, reflecting our culture's emphasis 
on rationality, as opposed to another criterion such as emotion 
or morality.156 Such hidden biases inhibit the progress of sex-
ual harassment jurisprudence because they favor a male per-
spective under the guise of neutrality.157 Feminists have at-
tempted to expose this illusion of neutrality so that our legal 
standards can be modified to correspond with women's lives as 
well as men's. 
state: "The standard provides sufficient flexibility and leeway to pennit due allow-
ance to be made for such differences between individuals as the law pennits to be 
taken into account, and for all of the particular circumstances of the case which 
may reasonable affect the conduct required, and at the same time affords a forulU-
la by which, so far as possible, a uniform standard may be maintained." Id. 
152. See supra note 145. 
153. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reason-
ableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1178 (1990); see also 
Donovan & Wildman, Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical Perspective on 
Self Defense and Provocation, 14 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 462-67 (1981) (legal ab-
stractions like the reasonable man standard both hide and perpetuate existing 
social inequalities). 
154. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard 
in Theory and Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398, 1405 (1992) (stating that the 
reasonable person standard is merely a cosmetic improvement to a reasonable man 
standard). See, Finley, A Break in the Silence: Including Women's Issues in a Torts 
Course, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 41, 59 (1989) (stating that despite use of "reason-
able person" language, court are evaluating a woman's conduct according to a male 
standard). 
155. Cahn, supra note 154, at 1405; see Ehrenreich, supra note 149, at 1192 
(stating that the reasonable person standard in operation merely contains and 
suppresses the contradiction between diversity and conformity, rather than over-
coming it). 
156. See, Bender, From Gender Differences to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol 
Gilligan and an Ethic of Care in Law, 15 VT. L. REv. I, 22 (1990) (rationality is 
not a neutral standard, and includes its own versions of emotion and morality). 
157. See supra note 153, at 1178. 
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Difference theories focus on the difference between men 
(as a group) and women (as a groUp).158 Difference feminist 
theory has been applied to demonstrate that the RPS may not 
be sufficiently flexible to accommodate divergent perspectives 
regarding sexual behavior, and therefore, is a particularly 
effective theoretical underpinning for justifying the implemen-
tation of the RWS.159 
Some courts have used difference theory to justify adopt-
ing the RWS. For example, in Robinson v. Jacksonville Ship-
yards 160, the United States District Court for the Eleventh 
Circuit heard expert testimony regarding the influence of por-
nography upon creating stereotyping in the workplace. In hold-
ing that a hostile work environment existed, the Robinson 
court accepted the premise that women view pornography in 
the workplace differently than men. 161 
The United States of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 
Ellison v. Brady 162 also applied difference theory to support 
its rationale for adopting a RWS. In Ellison, the court held a 
reasonable woman could consider the defendant's conduct, 
which included the defendant's act of sending a number of 
bizarre love letters to Kerry Ellison, "sufficiently severe and 
pervasive to alter the conditions of Ellison's employment and 
create an abusive working environment."I63 The Ellison court 
rejected a RPS stating "[i]f we only examined whether a rea-
158. See Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 799, 807 
(1989) (The author discusses how difference theory adopts positive attributes from 
traditional stereotypes while discarding negative ones). 
159. Cahn, supra note 154, at 1401. 
160. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F.Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 
1991). 
[d. 
161. [d. at 1505. The court stated: 
Dr. Fiske's testimony provided a sound, credible theoreti-
cal framework from which to conclude that the presence 
of nude and partially nude women, sexual comments, 
sexual joking, and other behaviors previously described 
creates and contributes to a sexually hostile work environ-
ment. Moreover, this framework provides an evidentiary 
baBis for concluding that a sexualized working environ-
ment is abusive to women because of her sex. 
162. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991). 
163. [d. at 878. 
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sonable person would engage in allegedly harassing conduct, 
we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing level of 
discrimination."IM The Ellison court explained that the differ-
ing perspectives of males and females regarding sexual behav-
ior must be considered in order to make an accurate assess-
ment of whether the victim's work environment was hos-
tile. l65 
Both the Jacksonville and the Ellison courts found the 
RPS standard to be an ineffective standard by which to make 
hostile environment determinations, and the outcomes of these 
cases demonstrate the validity of this position.l66 In both cas-
es, plaintiffs' recoveries depended upon the court's recognition 
that males and females interpret sexual behavior different-
ly.167 This principle suggests either that the RPS is not suffi-
ciently flexible to achieve just results, or that the RPS does not 
address the factor of gender appropriately.16s The fact that 
the standard chosen can be outcome determinative suggests 
that the flexibility of the RPS is suspect, challenging the foun-
dation upon which the Radtke court bases its argument.169 
Both the Robinson and Jacksonville holdings illustrate the 
obvious importance of acknowledging the existence and the 
164. [d. 
165. [d. The court stated "Conduct that many men consider unobjectionable may 
offend many women.". See, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 
898 (1st Cir. 1988) ("A male supervisor might believe, for example, that it is legit-
imate for him to tell a female subordinate that she has a 'great figure' or 'nice 
legs.' The female subordinate, however, may find such comments offensive"); Yates 
v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating "men and women are 
vulnerable in different ways and offended by different behavior"). 
166. See supra part lIB. 
167. See, Robinson, 760 F.Supp. at 1505. The court accepted testimony that 
"[m]en and women respond to sex issues in the workplace to a degree that ex-
ceeds normal differences in other perceptual reactions between them." [d. See also 
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 876. The district court, using a reasonable person standard, 
characterized defendant's conduct as "isolated and genuinely trivial." The Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that "in evaluating the severity 
and pervasiveness of sexual harassment, we should focus on the perspective of the 
victim." [d. at 878. 
168. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
stated that "[i]f we only examined whether a reasonable person would engage in 
allegedly harassing conduct, we would run the risk of reinforcing the prevailing 
level of discrimination." [d. 
169. [d. 
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validity of the female perspective when determining the exis-
tence of a hostile environment.17o To ignore the differing cul-
tural and physical factors that distinguish males and females 
seems antithetical to the purpose of Title VII, especially when 
it is those cultural and physical differences which form the 
bases for exploitation. Because the RPS fails to adequately 
account for a female perspective, the RPS can hardly be 
deemed an objective standard by which to evaluate the exis-
tence of a hostile work environment. 
B. THE RADTKE COURT'S REJECTION OF THE REASONABLE 
WOMAN STANDARD AS SUBJECTIVE 
The Radtke court attacked the validity of the RWS, claim-
ing 1) that the RWS was patently subjective and therefore 
harmful to the uniformity of the judicial system, and 2) that 
the RWS was injurious to the status of women in society. 171 
Regarding the fIrst point, the Court was highly critical of the 
RWS as being detrimental to the uniformity of the Michigan 
adjudicatory process. The Court claimed that the RWS cannot 
be objectively implemented in a diverse society.172 The Court 
reasoned that "the diversity of Michigan - a multitude of 
ethnic groups, national origins, religions, races, cultures, as 
well as divergences in wealth and education - would demand 
as many standards."173 Moreover, the Court held that "one 
standard of conduct has always regulated this diverse popula-
tion, and to hold otherwise would weave great discord and 
unnecessary confusion into the law."m 
To justify its assertions, the Radtke court stated that 
courts adopting victim-based perspectives have already begun 
to fragment the reasonable person standard.175 However, the 
170. See supra note 167. 
171. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 166-67. 
172. Radtke, 505 N.W.2d at 166. The court stated "a gender-conscious standard 
eliminates community standards and replaces them with a standards formulated 
by a subset of the community. An acceptance of a gender-conscious standard and 
the logic undergirding it would inexorably lead to the fragmentation of legal stan-
dards to the detriment of society." 1d. 
173. [d. at 171. 
174. [d. 
175. [d. The court listed the following cases as examples of the fragmentation 
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Radtke opinion fails to provide any evidence either that the 
courts have had difficulty applying a victim-based standard or 
that the courts have encountered any uncertainty or confusion 
resulting from the practice of applying such a standard. 176 
The court's second argument against the implementation 
of the RWS asserts that a gender-conscious standard is anti-
thetical to the purposes of the Michigan Civil Rights Act.177 
The Radtke court reasoned that "[sluch paternalism degrades 
women and is repugnant to the very ideals of equality that the 
act is intended to protect. "178 To support its position, the 
court relies on amicus curiae opposing the reasonable woman 
standard on the grounds that it harms women's position in 
society. 179 
Indeed, even feminists have their own reservations regard-
of the reasonable person standard: Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F.Supp. 
1509, 1516, n.12 (D. Me. 1991), vacated in part, 765 F.Supp. 1529 (D. Me. 1991) 
(utilizing the "reasonable person from the protected group of which the victim is a 
member" standard); Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F.Supp. 424, 429 (D. Ariz. 1992) (uti-
lizing the "reasonable person of the same gender and race or color standard"). 
176. Id. The Radtke court cited to cases which adopted a "victim-based" stan-
dard to support its fragmentation argument. However, the court did not illustrate 
or discuss any adverse effects resulting from the decisions of the aforementioned 
courts to adopt a "victim-based" standard. Id. 
177. Radtke, 501 N.W.2d at 167 (stating that "courts utilizing the reasonable 
woman standard pour into the standard stereotypical assumptions of women which 
infer women are sensitive, fragile, and in need of a more protective standard"). 
178. Id. The court included the following: "Furthermore, the 'reasonable woman' 
standard may reinforce the notion that women are 'different' from men and there-
fore need special treatment - a notion that has disenfranchised women in the 
workplace. Viewed from this perspective, a 'reasonable' standard may create the 
perception that sexual harassment law allows special treatment for women." 
Dragel, n.2 supra note 137 at 254; See also, Kenealy, Sexual Harassment and the 
Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 LAB. LAWYER 203-204 (1992). 
179. The amicus curiae University of Michigan Women and Law Clinic stated 
the following: 
Id. at 167. 
There are disadvantages to tailoring the standard solely 
to women. Being a member of a long-time disadvantaged 
group puts some women in a position where they need 
institutional support in achieving equality. However, that 
support, in and of itself, can cause others to stigmatize 
women a8 a weaker, less able group in need of protection. 
In effect, distinguishing women for special protection puts 
them back in the disadvantaged position which led to the 
need for special protection in the fIrst place. 
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ing the RWS and the possibility that it may entrench gender 
stereotypes. l80 Commentators have identified some of the 
problems that accompany the adoption of the RWS, including: 
1) the RWS denies the needs and realities of women in order to 
create them as del.icate, passive creatures;181 2) the RWS does 
not accommodate the experiences of all women;182 and 3) the 
RWS evaluates and standardizes the behavior of the victim as 
opposed to the behavior of the harasser.l83 However, not all 
commentators have condemned a RWS due to such deficien-
cies. l84 
The fact that the Radtke court dedicated only one para-
graph to support its holding that a RWS is harmful to the 
status of women undermines the idea that it legitimately in-
tended to enter the debate over the efficacy and the necessity 
of the RWS. Furthermore, the "special treatment" argument 
ignores the possibility that the conduct required under the 
RWS may someday become the norm. l85 While the Radtke 
court's intention to avoid building upon stereotypes of women 
is laudable, it makes little sense to assert that the possibility 
of reinforcing gender stereotypes justifies a rejection of the 
RWS, for the very existence of sexual harassment is based on 
the fact that such stereotypical ideas regarding women are 
already held by those who harass women.186 In other words, 
180. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 154, at 1415-17 (stating "[w]hile the standard 
nonetheless has enabled women to win some cases, and it may also depict some 
valuable attributes that can contribute to new possibilities of lawyering on behalf 
of women, its problems ultimately overwhelm its utility"). 
181. Id. at 1416; see Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the RejJublic of 
Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1581-84 (1991) (the author discusses the effects of 
domesticity on women). 
182. Id. The author states "[s]ome women accept as normal operating behavior 
actions that other women would equate with harassment." Id. 
183. Id. at 1417. 
184. Id. 
185. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 n.12 (9th Cir. 1991). The court 
stated: 
Id. 
We realize that the reasonable woman standard will not 
address conduct which some women find offensive. Con-
duct considered harmless by many today may be regarded 
as discriminatory in the future. Fortunately, the reason-
ableness inquiry which we adopt today is not static. As 
the views of reasonable women change, so too does the 
Title VII standard of acceptable behavior. 
186. See C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 18-23, 32 
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it is disingenuous to assert that the best way to eliminate 
sexual harassment is to ignore the existence of stereotypes 
that promote sexual harassment in the first place. 187 
v. CONCLUSION 
Sexual harassment is an invidious problem in the work 
environment,l88 and our present methodology for handling 
this problem is inhibited by our failure to recognize that men 
and women perceive differently the acceptable level of sexual 
conduct in the workplace.189 In order to eliminate the effects 
of gender prejudice, we must recognize how preconceived ideas 
regarding gender operate within the dynamics of male/female 
interactions. l90 Sexual harassment jurisprudence will become 
a more effective deterrent to sexual harassment once the law 
recognizes that males and females view sexual behavior differ-
ently.191 The RWS would require courts to recognize these so-
ciological differences, and to consider such differences when 
(1979) (asserting that sexual harassment is "a logical extension of the gender de-
. fined work role"). 
187. See Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Rea-
sonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1226 (1990). The au-
thor states: 
Id. 
If men are socialized to think that women should project 
an image of sexual availability on the job, then it is not 
that unusual to find that women feel compelled to do so. 
Nor is it unusual to find men responding to that image, 
and then blaming women as having "asked for it" when 
they subsequently complain that they were sexually ha-
rassed. 
188. Forty percent of female federal employees reported incidents of sexual 
harassment in 1987, roughly the same as in 1980. U.S. SYSTEMS PROTECTION 
BOARD, SEXUAL HARAsSMENT 1N THE FEDERAL GoVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 11 (1988). 
Victims of sexual harassment "pay all the intangible emotional costs inflicted by 
anger, humiliation, frustration, withdrawal, dysfunction in family life," as well as 
medical expenses, litigation expenses, job search expenses, and the loss of valuable 
sick leave and annual leave. Id. at 42. Sexual harassment cost the federal govern-
ment $267 million from May 1985 to May 1987 for losses in productivity, sick 
leave costs, and employee replacement costs. Id. at 39. 
189. See supra note 165. 
190. See supra note 187, at 1226. 
191. See, e.g., Pauline Bart, et at, The Different Worlds of Men and Women, in 
BEYOND METHODOLOGY 171 (Mary Freeman & Judith Wok eds. 1991). Pauline 
Bart's research on women's and men's attitudes towards pornography shows that 
they respond differently. For example, she found that 61% of men moderately or 
strongly agreed that pornography has its place, compared to 29% of women. 
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determining whether sexually related conduct has adversely 
affected another's working environment. As long as we ignore 
these differences, women will continue to live the effects of 
gender discrimination under the guise of being treated equally. 
As the Supreme Court observed in Jenness v. Fortson, "some-
times the greatest discrimination can lie in treating things 
that are different as though they were exactly alike."192 
Paul P. Dumont" 
192. 403 u.s. 431, 442 (1971). 
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